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Prudence, Information, and Trust Investment Law 
by John A. Humbach and Stephen P. Dresch 
Professors Langbein and Posner recently proposed substantial costs, both in gathering information on which 
that fiduciaries be allowed to invest in market funds to make decisions and in effectuating purchases and sales 
under a relaxation of the prudent investor standard. in conformity with those decisions. These costs are un- 
But a relaxation of the selectivity requirements may rewarded since the competition among "prudent" inves- 
be destructive of capital market efficiency and tors, who all must rely on the same general information 
perhaps of the capital markets themselves. sources, tends to cancel out any gains that informed 
judgments could provide. It is apparently the recent ex- 
perience of mutual funds that none has outperformed the 
market with a consistency greater than the law of aver- 
ages would predict. Optimal results in portfolio man- 
agement are obtainable by simply buying and holding the 
I N THE MANAGEMENT of assets and portfolios, fiduciaries are required to meet a standard of care 
known typically as the prudent investor standard. When 
applying this standard, courts historically have tended to 
consider each of the fiduciary's investment decisions 
separately. Losses owing to careless judgments may not 
be offset by gains from investments more carefully 
selected. To avoid surcharge, the fiduciary must meet 
the requisite duty of care with respect to every invest- 
ment. Meeting this duty involves substantial expense in 
time and money, and this expense must be deducted from 
the over-all performance of the portfolio. 
In their recent article in this Journal (July, page 
887), "The Revolution in Trust Investment Law," John 
H. Langbein and Richard A. Posner, professors of law at 
the University of Chicago, suggested that the prudent 
investor standard ought to be changed. Rather than each 
of a fiduciary's investment decisions being viewed sepa- 
rately, they assert, the fiduciary's exercise of care in 
certain cases ought to be judged on the basis of his 
selection of the portfolio as a whole. 
The Market Fund Portfolio 
The purpose of this revision would be to permit 
fiduciaries to invest in so-called market fund portfolios. 
These are highly diversified, broadly based collections of 
securities purchased rather nonselectively and, once 
purchased, held more or less indefinitely. The objective 
of the market fund approach is to create a portfolio that 
parallels on a miniature scale the diversity and propor- 
tionate values of the market as a whole and, accordingly, 
will perform about as well or as badly as the general 
market. 
In support of their proposed revision, Professors 
- - 
Langbein and Posner argue essentially as follows: 
The traditional practice of picking and choosing par- 
ticular stocks for portfolio inclusion or sale involves 
stocks of every issuer in proportion to the value each 
issuer's outstanding stocks bears to the aggregate value 
of all outstanding stocks. Then we can fire all of the 
securities analysts, save most of the brokerage fees, and 
still have a portfolio that will perform about as well as any 
other. 
There is, we can see, a certain logic in asserting that 
fiduciaries should not be required to evaluate and choose 
individual stocks for their portfolios. If the same results 
are obtainable at lesser management cost by blind diver- 
sification alone, then portfolio managers who are not 
almost totally passive are simply wasting their princi- 
pals' money. 
Professors Langbein and Posner describe their new 
standard ofprudence as a "revolution in trust investment 
law." Insofar as they imply that calculated ignorance is 
really the most prudent approach to investment, their 
suggestions call for quite a revolution indeed. The ques- 
tion their analysis appears to overlook, however, is 
whether, more broadly viewed, it would be good public 
policy to require or even to condone observance by 
fiduciaries of the ignorance-as-prudence standard. When 
the over-all effects on capital markets are considered, 
there is good reason to conclude that the "revolution- 
ary'' standard of Professors Langbein and Posner would 
not be good public policy. 
The Functioning of Capital Markets 
From a social point of view, perhaps the most irnpor- 
tant function of competitive capital markets is to allocate 
capital resources among operating firms in a way that 
maximizes the productivity of society's aggregate capital 
assets. In practice this result is achieved by competitive 
bidding for investment dollars among the various se- 
curities issuers who desire to use those dollars for the 
purchase of "real" capital (machinery, plants, working 
capital, and the like). In exchange for investment dollars, 
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these competitive bidders offer participations in streams 
of future earnings which, it is anticipated, their respec- 
tive firms can produce. When capital market investors 
purchase the stocks of firms having the best prospects of 
highest percentage returns, the result is to allocate 
monetary capital (and hence "real" capital) to the uses 
most likely to result in the maximum economic benefit. 
Of course, almost all securities trading is in existing 
shares-the substitution of one investor's dollars for the 
dollars some other investor already has placed in an 
outstanding stock issue. Nonetheless, under a free en- 
terprise system of production, the competitive prices 
developed from this "secondary" trading in common 
stocks can be seen as essential if "real" capital is to be 
efficiently allocated to its optimal uses. In any event, the 
price generating process of active trading is essential to 
permit investors of monetary capital to distribute their 
dollars among securities having return, risk, and risk- 
variance characteristics they desire. 
If Market Fund Portfolios Were to Predominate 
The capital market's price generating process cannot 
work efficiently-and it cannot allocate capital to its 
most productive uses-unless investors in the capital 
market pick and choose intelligently among competing 
investment opportunities. If investors blindly purchase 
and retain some of every stock offered, the result will be 
a nonoptimal and "irrational" allocation of both invest- 
ment dollars and "real" capital assets. Promising and 
nonpromising uses of capital alike would share arbitrar- 
ily in the limited supply of capital. The prices of all 
stocks, moreover, would be frozen (irrespective of 
changing returns, risks, etc.) at the relative levels 
- - 
reached once the last investors discovered the logic of 
totally passive market fund investment. 
Professors Langbein and Posner admit that the capital 
market would cease to be efficient if all investors adopted 
the passive "buy-the-market-and-hold" strategy. In 
fact, it would almost cease to be at all. For the most part, 
the only remaining types of transactions would be those 
involved in the purchases of wholly new issues and those 
required in order to place net increments or to recover 
net decrements in the aggregate of investment dollars. 
Professors Langbein and Posner suggest that trading 
also would be necessary "when substantial changes in 
the market price of a security require its inclusion or 
exclusion from the portfolio in order to maintain the 
portfolio's fidelity to the market as a whole." This is, 
however, erroneous. If the market price of a security 
changed, thus altering the relationship between its value 
in aggregate and the aggregate value of all securities in 
the relevant market, the price change itself would simul- 
taneously effectuate a corresponding alteration within a 
market fund portfolio. Unless resort be had to a picking 
and choosing strategy-for example, selecting securities 
for inclusion or exclusion in the relevant market- 
there would be no justification for altering holdings in 
response to changes in market price. 
In connection with increments-decrements transac- 
tions, there also might be a certain amount of reshuffling 
activity as market fund investors changed in size relative 
to each other and as new investors entered or old ones 
left the "industry." However, there would be no logical 
place for the active public trading markets that now exist 
for common stocks, and one would expect those markets 
to be quickly replaced by a decentralized "market" 
dominated by privately negotiated transfers. The ques- 
tion may be asked: Who would be available to negotiate 
competently these private transfers once all of the 
analysts had been dispensed with? This problem, how- 
ever, is only an offshoot of the primary paradox posed by 
the Langbein-Posner proposal. 
Professors Langbein and Posner deny that the capital 
market would freeze in this Vonnegutesque fashion as 
the application of their strategy crystallized into reality. 
They point out that there still would be "many other 
investors" who would be willing to continue incurring 
information and transactions costs and using their hard- 
bought information to bid up undervalued stocks and bid 
down overvalued ones. We are told that "enormous 
gains" would be available to these inveterate traders, 
and we assume, although are not told, that enormous 
losses also would be available. In any event, however, 
the activities of these traders supposedly would mean 
that stock prices would continue to be established in 
competitive trading and that the market would remain 
efficient as an allocator of capital. The passive market 
fund investors could enjoy a free ride on the information 
and transactions expenditures others would incur in 
order to keep the relative pricing of securities economi- 
cally rational. 
The Free Ride for Market Fund Investors 
From a policy viewpoint, three observations may 'be 
made concerning this free ride. 
First, if those who are involuntarily piggybacked hap- 
pen not to be representative in their attitudes toward the 
factors influencing stock prices-for examples, risk and 
return, risk-adversity, economic conditions affecting the 
issuer, and the like-then the relative prices developed in 
trades among them will not be representative either. By 
"representative" prices, we mean the prices that would 
be established if all investors were active in the pricing 
process, not just a self-selected few. 
There is no reason to believe that the insistent traders 
or the prices they establish would be representative. In 
the first place, once the Langbein-Posner insights be- 
come generally known, the traders would have to be 
persons willing to ignore the obvious advantage to the 
individual of applying the passive, market fund strategy. 
The remaining traders probably would be (if rational) at 
least more risk seeking than the norm, and the price 
patterns they generate would reflect this. Worse yet, if 
the thesis is correct about the self-cancelling effects of 
competitive trading, those traders may have to be practi- 
cally risk oblivious, not unlike horse bettors who know 
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that the odds are always substantially against them but 
hope to beat the odds nonetheless. To the extent that 
capital allocations were heavily influenced by these per- 
sons' decisions, aggregate rates of return and production 
would decline; that is, stocks having a sufficiently high 
risk variance would be able to command new capital 
from these investors even though offering a relatively 
lower expected return. As a result, the rate of return to 
the aggregate of capital would decline; that is, production 
would decline. 
Second, even if those who were piggybacked did con- 
stitute an attitudinal cross-section of all investors, almost 
by definition they would not be representative in terms of 
resources available for gathering information. This is 
because the market fund strategy can be used only; by 
investors or investor pools having large amounts of capi- 
tal. The investors who will withdraw from the price 
generating process will be precisely those who are likely 
to be best informed and whose information is likely, by 
the magnitude of their trades, to have the maximum 
impact on prices. Much of the rationalizing effect on 
prices would certainly be lost if, as Professors Langbein 
and Posner appear to suggest, fiduciary investors were 
legally required to apply the market fund strategy to 
portfolio management. But even if the market fund 
strategy were not a legal requirement for fiduciaries, 
condoning the use of the strategy will cost the market and 
society its best endowed and probably best informed 
participants in the capital allocation process. Capital 
markets would continue to reach equilibria as the per- 
ceived expectations of the traders changed. However, 
the equilibria reached, and the capital allocations based 
on them, would be distorted to the extent that the cur- 
tailment of information inputs distorts the over-all "mar- 
ket judgment" concerning the relative values of stocks. 
How Important Is Informed Trading? 
The third observation, which arises from the second, 
is that Professors Langbein and Posner are erroneous in 
assuming that if some investors are willing to make a 
market, then active and informed trading by others is 
"unnecessary and unprofitable. " 
Active selection, rejection, and rearrangment of 
portfolios-that is, active, informed trading-is con- 
stantly required of all investors if the market's equilib- 
ria and capital allocations are to be based on the 
maximum possible input of information and attitudes. 
Suggesting that the market can get by on less information 
is rather like suggesting that it is unnecessary to vote. It 
is true that the advantages secured through information 
and transactions costs are generally cancelled out by 
similar advantages others have secured to themselves. 
best possible market estimates of the "right" prices for 
purposes of optimal capital allocation. 
To get the best possible market estimates, the input of 
the greatest possible number of informed individual es- 
timates is required. As these individual estimates are 
"voted in" by bids and offers, many (most?) will be 
cancelled out by others. At equilibrium, all will be can- 
celled out. But if there are abstainers, unless their selec- 
tion as such is statistically random, the pattern of prices 
at equilibrium will be nonrepresentative. If the abstain- 
ers are those likely to be best informed, moreover, the 
equilibrium price pattern will probably be less maximiz- 
ing than if there were no abstentions. This is because, 
presumably, the better the over-all knowledge of 
traders, the more efficient will be the market. Thus, in 
order to allocate capital as efficiently as possible, in- 
formed trading by all investors, particularly well- 
endowed ones (such as, typically, fiduciaries) is neces- 
sary. 
The Social Cost of Abstaining Investors 
Finally, there is the question whether active, informed 
trading by a portfolio manager is unprofitable. In answer- 
ing this question, it must be asked: Unprofitable com- 
pared with what? If Professors Langbein and Posner 
mean that active, informed trading is unprofitable com- 
pared with free loading, they are undoubtedly correct. 
On the other hand, if they mean that it is socially un- 
profitable to have every investor engage in largely dup- 
licative and self-cancelling securities analysis and 
portfolio rearrangement, the correctness of the assertion 
is more problematical. 
On a cost-benefit basis, the cost of absentions by in- 
vestors is the lost production that results from a greater 
or lesser misallocation of capital resources. The benefits 
But all this says is that, once the market closely ap- John A. Humbach (left) is a member of the Fordham Law School 
proaches an equilibrium position, information from faculty, teaching in the property field. He is a graduate of Miami 
which that equilibrium position can be inferred and on UniversiW (A.B.1963) and Ohio State University (1966). Stephen P. Dresch is director of research of the Institute for Demographic and 
which it is based is No surprises there' The Economic Studies at New Haven, Connecticut. He is a graduate of 
important thing, from a policy viewpoint, is to be sure Miami University (A.B. 1963) and holds a Ph.D. in economics from 
that the patterns of prices existing at equilibrium are the Yale University. 
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of abstention are, of course, the savings in information 
and transactions expenditures. Whether the costs of 
abstentions outweigh the benefits, or vice versa, is a 
matter for the perspicacious. We, at least, are not able to 
discern whether having abstainers in the market process 
is profitable or unprofitable. We would note, however, 
that better information should allocate capital more 
beneficially than worse information and that the sources 
of information we should least like to excuse are those 
who can most accurately and efficiently (cost per dollar 
of investment) serve as such. 
Implications for Policy Concerning Market Funds 
What conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing? 
First, it is submitted that a market-fund investment 
strategy, although perhaps individually advantageous, is 
socially disadvantageous and that it would be bad policy 
to condone, much less require, that strategy. Given the 
financial analyses referred to and developed by Profes- 
sors Langbein and Posner, and which in the main we do 
not dispute, this would appear to mean that in practice no 
investment portfolio could be expected consistently to 
exceed or even to match the performance of broadly 
based common stock indices. That the indices' perfor- 
mance cannot be consistently exceeded appears simply 
to be a fact of life, inherent in the nature of capital 
markets. That the performance cannot ev'en be equalled 
would merely be the result of a policy decision-that 
information and transaction costs must be borne and free 
loading must be disallowed. But it appears to be an 
appropriate policy decision nonetheless. 
There is no reason in principle why certain portfolios 
should be entitled to perform as well as an imaginary, 
frictionless-world portfolio, such as the Standard and 
Poor's 500. Transactions costs and information costs are 
a part of doing business. On the other hand, by attempt- 
ing to save the costs of informed investment decisions, 
portfolios managers in effect would be trying to evade 
their fair share contribution to the costs of effectuating 
rational allocations of capital. Just because this particu- 
lar social function--capital allocation-happens' in the 
free enterprise system to be decentralized (unlike, say, 
national defense), it does not follow that attempted eva- 
sions of one's aliquot support for this function are any 
less to be condemned. 
Only by requiring portfolio managers to use due care in 
selecting each issue for purchase and sale can the capital 
allocation process itself be said to be operated with due 
care. Revolutions that corrode the efficiency of free en- 
terprise ought to be eschewed. A 
